David Voss: Dallas Is Making a Historic City Hall Decision With ‘Faulty Information’

By David Voss
Former Assistant Director of Building Services for the City of Dallas

The Dallas City Council is making one of the most important decisions in Dallas history based on faulty information. The Council voted 9-6 to move forward with a plan to abandon the City Hall building* based on a report titled “Proposed City Hall Repair Program.” This report was presented to the Council in two parts, Phase I on May 20, 2026, and Phase II on June 3, 2026. This was not information worthy of staking a decision on, much less the future of Dallas City Hall.

The report was a very expensive answer to the wrong question.

It turns out that the Proposed City Hall Repair Program is not a repair program at all. The Phase II report proposes a scope of work that basically demos the interior of the building to near shell condition, and then constructs a new building inside the existing concrete structure of City Hall.

This proposal is not a repair project. It is a construction project. They made a mistake and called it what it really is, “Construction Of Base Building,” in the Phase II report.

Let me repeat: THIS PROPOSAL IS NOT A REPAIR PROJECT! This is a scheme that replaces the electrical system, replaces the HVAC system and controls, demolishes and replaces the restrooms, replaces lighting, demolishes the interior, and adds fire protection.

What the city actually needs to do is repair what needs to be repaired and then maintain it — not gut it.

Right now, no one knows what the repairs to City Hall will cost. But the numbers that have been and are being proposed by the City are on the far extreme of high-end estimates, outside of the necessary scope, and well beyond realistic.

I’ve spent 50 years examining, negotiating, contesting, and accepting proposals and estimates related to maintaining, repairing, and constructing buildings, some of them older and larger than Dallas City Hall. At the planning phase, consultants and contractors always (1) inflate the base costs to make up for the lack of detailed knowledge of the project, (2) add extreme amounts for contingencies to cover their asses, and (3) increase soft costs to line their pockets if they get the project.

The AECOM report, which was completed last fall, admittedly, is the “not re-estimated” baseline (meaning those numbers were taken at face value) for this new Proposed City Hall Repair Program. If you remember, the AECOM report had a “Total Hard Construction Cost Incl. Other Indirect Costs” of $329 million. They arrived at the $329 million by taking the “Hard Construction Costs” of $153 million, then adding 20% for “Design Contingencies,” then adding 29.25% for “General Conditions, Insurance, Bonds, and Contractor Overhead and Profit,” then adding 10% for inflation, then adding 23% for “Design Fees, Supervision, Inspection, and Overhead.”

All of these “Indirect Costs”/soft cost percentages were compounded, creating a whopping total of 109% of soft costs (very soft, I might add) added to the project to create the $329 million price tag. (See Chart #2 from the AECOM report).

So, based on this scheme, let’s say you replaced the roof early on in the project (which should absolutely be done) and the City contracted directly with a competent roofing contractor. Then they directly hired a roofing consultant to provide the specifications and supervise the installation for 2%. The cost savings would be over 50% of the number in the AECOM report. The actual cost would be half. An $8 million roof replacement shouldn’t cost $16 million plus. These kinds of numbers became the “baseline” for the Proposed City Hall Repair Program.

The new Proposed City Hall Repair Program identified four “hard cost” numbers of between $531 million and $610 million, depending on the consultant and the phasing of the project. The Phase II report increases the base cost by adding 15% for contingencies; 12% for GC, GR, Insurances, Bonds, Overhead and Profit; 6% for Escalation; 7% for Design Fees; 5% for Supervision, Inspections & Overhead; 3% for Third Party Consultants; 1% for Permits; and 0.5% for Testing and Inspections. These percentages add up to 49.5%. (See Chart #3 from the Phase II/WM2 Company report).

There was not enough detail in the numbers to determine if these percentages were compounded (as they were in the AECOM report), but if they were, it would mean a 60.37% increase over the base cost. This is an enormous, unnecessary cost representation of the costs to repair City Hall.

Many of the elements of the needed repairs at City Hall could, should, and would (by any realistic, real-world building owner) be contracted directly with specialty contractors. For instance, you would hire an electrical contractor, an elevator contractor, and a mechanical contractor to do that work. You would also hire a specifically disciplined engineering firm, an electrical engineer, a vertical transportation engineering firm, and a mechanical engineer to design, assist with the bidding process, and supervise that work. You would not hire a general contractor and a boatload of consultants to effectively and efficiently accomplish the repairs.

However, some of the repair elements are more complex and would require a multi-disciplinary approach with several subcontractors and trades. This would include restroom upgrades and fire protection systems, but careful orchestration and management of the elements would reduce the soft costs greatly.

The City Council has made decisions based on its assumption that it’s too expensive to repair Dallas City Hall. The City Council has not investigated what it would actually cost to repair Dallas City Hall. At some point early in this discussion, someone decided the answer that they wanted and then framed the question and the facts presented to support that answer.

There is no reason to continue trying to fast-track this decision — the Mavs have made their choice. We need to collectively slow down, catch our breath, and gather some more detailed (much more detailed) and accurate (much more accurate) information. We need to calmly hear from and listen to both sides (in a more meaningful format than limited one-minute, one-way speeches) about what needs to be done with the City Hall building. We also need to have broader discussions about what needs to be done with the City of Dallas. In the meantime, let’s authorize repairing some stuff that there is money available for, and let’s mandate maintaining some stuff — that’s what needs to be fast-tracked.

David Voss spent nearly five decades managing and maintaining major public and commercial properties. He began his career with the City of Dallas, rising from a maintenance employee to assistant director of Building Services, before holding executive operations roles with Trammell Crow Company, Crow Holdings, and the Dallas Market Center. He later founded David Voss Consulting, advising clients on facility and construction management until retiring in 2022.

*EDITOR’S NOTE: The city council voted to shelve a phased repair of City Hall and continue exploring relocation and redevelopment options.